Limit-Phenomena and Phenomenology in Husserl by Steinbock Anthony J

Author:Steinbock, Anthony J.
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781786605009
Publisher: National Book Network International

The Concreteness of Generative Phenomenology

Although I have made this point earlier concerning the concreteness of generative method, I revisit it here briefly because in its own way it follows a movement that allows for a comparison with Hegel’s phenomenology—though for Husserl it is framed differently. It has to do with the privileged role of generative phenomenology in relation to static and genetic methods.

It was characteristic of Husserl’s thought, methodologically, to begin with what he interpreted as “simpler” and then move to what was more “complex.” This is why he often privileged the static over the dynamic as a starting point for phenomenological investigations. In terms of the development of phenomenology, this meant that on the whole Husserl began clarifying static structures of conscious intentionality as “most basic,” then moved to temporal analyses of the individual; it was only after he thought he was ready to move on that he broached the question of history and intersubjectivity over the generations. The former “lower levels” were construed as a Leitfaden or as leading clues to the later “higher levels.”

But by the time Husserl undertakes generative analyses, he recognizes a reversal (granted, perhaps not as quickly and forcefully as he should have): static constitutive analyses are abstract and not the most basic given the disclosure of genesis (and generativity); static phenomena like consciousness are not independent, but dependent structures. More concrete phenomena, for example, are those that express the normality and abnormality of the lived‑body, self-temporalization, and monadic individuation or facticity; “absolute consciousness” is seen as abstract in relation to the “true” absolute of self‑temporalization (H 3: § 81). But where temporalization is concerned, self-temporalization is founded in a deeper ground, revealing self-temporalization as “abstract” in relation to a movement that is still more concrete. Husserl writes: “If we put generation into play, then in terms of concretion, this progression is also a concretization of the remaining co‑humanity, mother, i.e., parents and child, etc.; and at the same time we have a more concrete, generatively formed temporalization and historical environing‑world” (H 15: 138 fn. 2).

Just as static phenomena are abstract when viewed from the perspective of genesis (H 14: especially, 34, 43, 47), viewed now from the standpoint of generativity, self‑temporalization of the individual, synchronic intersubjectivity “within” a generation, and so on, are understood as “abstract historicity”; it abstracts from Generativity disclosed as the co‑foundational relation of homeworld/alienworld. But, again, all this is discerned from the disclosure of Generativity. This is how we can notice a discursive shift in Husserl when describing the phenomena: on the one hand, the lower and more basic, and the higher and complex—and on the other, the abstract and concrete (whereby the lower phenomena are now “abstract” in relation to the concrete and the more fundamental, which were previously “higher” and founded). Now we find: (1) Generative phenomenology whose matter is generativity is the most concrete dimension of phenomenology; it concerns intersubjective, historical movement. (2) Genetic phenomenology treats generativity shorn of its historical/generational dimension. It can still be

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